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Abstract:
We study optimal sustainable policies in a benchmark logistic world (where both population
and technological progress follow logistic laws of motion) subject to a pollution ceiling. The
main policy in the hands of the benevolent planner is pollution abatement, ultimately leading
to the control of a dirtiness index as in the early literature of the limits to growth literature.
Besides inclusion of demographic dynamics, we also hypothesize that population size affects
negatively the natural regeneration or assimilation rate, as a side product of human activities
(like increasing pollution, deforestation,...). We first characterize optimal sustainable policies.
Under certain conditions, the planner goes to the pollution ceiling value and stays on, involving
a more stringent environmental policy and a sacrifice in terms of consumption per capita. Sec-
ond, we study how the sustainable problem is altered when we depart from the logistic world
by considering exponential technical progress (keeping population growth logistic). It’s shown
that, as expected, introducing such an asymmetry widens the margins of optimal policies as sus-
tainable environmental policies are clearly less stringent under exponential technical progress.
Third, we connect our model to the data, using in particular UN population projections.
Keywords: Limits to growth, Sustainable policy, Optimal growth, Demographic dynamics,
Pollution ceiling
2
1 Introduction
Since the publication of the Meadows report in 1972, the long-term sustainability of the current
human development standards has become a key debate in so many disciplines such as ecology
and environmental science, climatology or economics. First, dismissed by leading economists
like Nobel prize Solow (1974), the Meadows report and the limits to growth hypothesis have
had an increasing importance over time in the economic literature. The issue of the long-
term sustainability of the so-called modern economic growth regime is now at the heart of
many economic research programs. Initially, the sustainability issue has been more tightly
connected with the availability of natural resources, notably nonrenewable resources, rather
than with the impact of carbon emissions on global warming and the like. An early sake for
an operational sustainability concept can be found indeed in Hartwick (1977) who proposed an
investment rule of rents extracted from the exploitation of nonrenewable resources to ensure a
constant positive welfare level forever. Since then, many authors have attempted to build up
normative and positive frames for sustainable development. Pioneering works in this stream
are Barbier (1987), Daly (1990) and Pezzey (1992), while Chichilnisky (1996) has provided with
an influential axiomatic approach to sustainability.
Environmental concerns, say pollution and global warming, came a bit later. As excel-
lently explained in a recent article by Amigues and Moreaux (2013), the economists commu-
nity responded to the first alarming reports of the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, launched in 1988) by constructing large scale models mimicking climatological models
and therefore fully resorting to numerical simulations: these are the first integrated models
merging economic and geophysical equations such like the DICE model developed by Nord-
haus (1993). More economic approaches to sustainability under global warming have however
emerged from the mid-90s. Many of the works in this stream combine the sustainability concern
arising from depletion of (non-renewable) natural resources and the sustainability constraints
due to environmental criteria (see, among others, Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen, 1993, and With-
agen, 1994). Obviously, the two aspects are connected: carbon emissions come from the use
of fossil energy and the nonrenewable natural resources studied in this literature are precisely
fossil inputs. Imposing environmental norms like pollution ceilings constrains the dynamics
of resource depletion, and therefore leads to decrease consumption at a certain point in time
and a subsequent welfare loss. A large body of papers have been written along these lines as
documented in Amigues and Moreaux (2013).
Strangely enough, population dynamics are typically ignored in this literature. In 1991,
Robert Solow concluded a public lecture as follows: “...I have left out of this talk, as some
of you may have noticed until now, any mention to population growth; and I did that on
purpose, although it might be the natural first order concern if you are thinking about
sustainability issues...You know that, I know that, and I have no particular competence to
discuss it any further.” (page 186). Indeed, there are several channels through which population
growth impacts (sustainable) development: increasing depletion of natural resources, increasing
pollution and other direct consequences of human activities (like deforestation, urbanization
or intensive agriculture) which damage the self-cleaning capacity (or natural regeneration) of
Nature. In this paper, we propose a benchmark demo-economic model which incorporates some
realistic demographic ingredients and still allows for a (limited) analytical characterization. In
particular, we assume two things. First of all, we hypothesize that population follows an
exogenous logistic law of motion. Clearly enough, the logistic law is only an approximation
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(and probably a rough one in many circumstances) to human demographic dynamics. This said,
it clearly outperforms the exponential growth law of motion typical assumed in the neoclassical
economic growth theory which is by far unrealistic as it assumes unbounded growth. Recently,
several authors have attempted to incorporate bounded demographic growth into textbook
economic growth models, the most successful being Guerrini (2006). Our paper can be seen as
a similar incursion into the body of sustainable (optimal) growth models with pollution ceiling.
Second, and beside the fact that a larger population means more aggregate production and
consumption (just like in the neoclassical model with exponential growth), we further assume
that a larger population size decreases the regeneration rate of Nature. Again, this might be a
direct consequence of urbanization and deforestation, or via an increase in pollution. Several
authors have been arguing since Tahvonen and Withagen (1996) that the regeneration rate falls
in an irreversible way if the pollution stock exceeds a certain threshold value (see also Prieur,
2009, and Boucekkine et al., 2013a, 2013b). We shall assess whether these two “demographic”
departures from the typical sustainable growth model matter in the design of optimal policies
and to which extent they do matter. It’s worth pointing out here that we do not include in
this benchmark analysis population control policies. In our framework, population dynamics
are exogenous (following a logistic curve as mentioned just above). Rather, we complement our
theoretical analysis with some numerical simulations based on UN demographic projections:
with these projections in hands, should we expect that pollution ceilings will be soon or later
reached, ultimately requiring the tightening of environmental regulation standards?
In order to derive some analytical results, we remove natural resources depletion from the
model. Since population growth is already active through the natural regeneration rate, the
model already includes a significant channel through which demographic growth affects the
environment, and the size of this effect can be calibrated in the associated numerical exper-
iments. With this simplification, the considered optimal growth model includes two state
equations (capital and pollution) and two exogenously given law of motions for population and
technology, the pollution stock being subject to a ceiling (pure state constraint). To keep some
symmetry in the benchmark model, we shall start modelling technological dynamics as a logistic
curve too (bounded growth) to neutralize somehow the exogenous pro and contra-sustainable
forces. The case of exogenous exponential technological progress is also studied to comple-
ment the analysis. Needless to say, just like for population dynamics, controlled technological
dynamics are also another way to ensure sustainable growth via R&D expenditures, either to
foster output-increasing or energy-saving technological progress (see Boucekkine, Hritonenko
and Yatsenko, 2013, for a recent framework including a pollution ceiling, or for the development
of backstop technologies as in Tsur and Zemel, 2003). Again, here we focus on environmental
policy. Environmental policy consists in a single control, abatement. To model abatement, we
follow the line opened by Stokey (1998) as recently reformulated by Aznar and Ruiz-Tamarit
(2012). Last but not least, as repeatedly mentioned above, we work within the framework of
optimal growth, that’s by considering a benevolent planner maximizing the social welfare of
the economy subject to the set of “endogenous” and exogenous state equations listed above
and in particular to a pollution ceiling. Welfare per period depends on consumption per capita
and environmental quality pretty much in line with the traditional approach in this stream of
literature (see Stokey, 1998, after Forster, 1975).
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the benchmark economy. Section 3
presents the complete optimal growth model to study and derives the set of necessary conditions.
Section 4 studies the non-binding state constraint case. Section 5 analyses the situation where
4
the pollution ceiling is reached. Section 6 goes to the special case where technological progress
has unbounded growth (exponential technological progress). In Sections 3 to 6, the long-term
equilibria are derived in closed-form and discussed. Section 7 is the experimental part of
the paper: the benchmark model is first calibrated, then simulated along three demographic
scenarios based on UN projections. Section 8 concludes.
2 The model economy
The model economy is a one sector closed economy. Output is obtained according to an aggre-
gate neoclassical production function depending on the technological level and both physical
capital and labor stocks,
Y (t) = A (t)1−βK (t)β N (t)1−β . (1)
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that this production function comes from the direct
summation of the individual production functions for many identical firms. The technical
progress is Harrod-neutral. Technological level, denoted by A, is exogenous. In the benchmark
analysis, we assume that it evolves according to the logistic differential equation
•
A (t) = xA (t)
(
1− A (t)
A
)
, (2)
where A > 0 is the technological carrying capacity and x ≥ 0 is an upper bound for the rate
of technological change. The initial technological level is A (t0) = A0 > 0. As mentioned in
the introduction, this benchmark technological configuration is considered to keep a certain
symmetry with population dynamics. The case of exponential technological growth, which is a
limit case of the logistic curve, is handled in Section 6. It’s worth mentioning here that while
the logistic curves (also called S-shaped curves in the technological literature) better fit the
diffusion of a given technology (reflecting for example learning or imitation), they may not be
good at representing technological progress from a long-term perspective. Recently, Chang and
Baek (2010) have studied technological improvements from this perspective: they show that
the latter take the form of an upward trended sequence of connected or disconnected S-shaped
curves, featuring a kind of sustainable improvement without limit mainly due to a series of
emerging new technologies. Our study includes both the logistic and exponential cases.
The solution to the above Bernoulli’s differential equation is
A (t) =
AA0 exp (x (t− t0))
A0 exp (x (t− t0)) +
(
A− A0
) . (3)
We can see that A monotonically increases converging to lim
t→∞
A (t) = A. Consequently, the
variable rate of technical progress is
x (t) = x
(
1− A (t)
A
)
=
x
(
1− A0
A
)
A0
A
exp (x (t− t0)) +
(
1− A0
A
) , (4)
with x (t0) = x0 = x
(
1− A0
A
)
≤ x and lim
t→∞
x (t) = 0.
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The economy is populated by many identical and infinitely lived agents. Population, denoted
by N , is assumed exogenous but it evolves according to the logistic differential equation
•
N (t) = nN (t)
(
1− N (t)
N
)
, (5)
where N > 0 is the population carrying capacity and n ≥ 0 is an upper bound for the rate
of population growth. The initial population is N (t0) = N0 > 0. The solution to the above
Bernoulli’s differential equation is
N (t) =
NN0 exp (n (t− t0))
N0 exp (n (t− t0)) +
(
N −N0
) . (6)
We can see that N monotonically increases converging to lim
t→∞
N (t) = N . Consequently, the
variable rate of population growth is
n (t) = n
(
1− N (t)
N
)
=
n
(
1− N0
N
)
N0
N
exp (n (t− t0)) +
(
1− N0
N
) . (7)
with n (t0) = n0 = n
(
1− N0
N
)
≤ n and lim
t→∞
n (t) = 0.
We now come to a crucial part of the model, pollution and abatement modelling. Although
pollution emissions may be originated both in the processes of consumption and production,
we focus on pollution generated by firms. Pollution emissions are a by-product of economic
activity, arising as an unintended output when firms produce according to (1). There is not
free disposability of the residuals. Instead, firms are allowed to engage in costly abatement
activities to mitigate emissions they produce, and the environment shows a certain absorptive
capacity to clean up pollution.1
Following Aznar and Ruiz-Tamarit (2012), we argue that all these issues are better captured
in a multiple relationship framework. One major feature of our model is the existence of a stock
of pollutants S, which is increased by polluting activities such as production Y , but is reduced
by abatement B as well as by the corresponding natural regeneration at a variable rate δ (t) ≥ 0.
Moreover, we require that pollution cannot exceed an upper bound for S, called Smax, which
thus plays the role of a ceiling value beyond which it is implicitly assumed that the economy
enters a catastrophic state. The critical level Smax > 0 is known with certainty, but the
occurrence of the catastrophic event is endogenous and depends on agents’ economic decisions.
Under these assumptions, sustainable development will be characterized as a situation where
the main economic variables show nonnegative long-run balanced growth while, at the same
time, they contribute to generate an accumulated stock of pollutants smaller than (or equal to)
the critical value Smax.
The above-mentioned abatement effort B, which is costly and decided by economic agents,
will be measured in terms of output Y (t) in such a way that these two variables relate to each
other according to
B(t) = Y (t)− YN(t) = (1− z(t))Y (t). (8)
1We only consider mitigation in this paper. Alternative environmental policies include adaptation measures
to global warming such like improvement of coastal protection infrastructure or warning systems (see Bre´chet
et al., 2013).
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Here z(t) represents, as in Stokey (1998), a measure of the effective dirtiness of the technique
used to produce. Obviously, z(t) = 1− B(t)
Y (t)
∈ [0, 1] because resources devoted to clean pollution
can never exceed the current production. Therefore, any choice for z close to zero or one
automatically makes the existing technique less or more polluting respectively. The above
expression introduces a definition for the net output as
YN(t) = z(t)Y (t). (9)
The equation governing the motion of S may be written as
•
S (t) = P (Y (t),B (t))−δ (t)S (t),
where P (Y (t),B (t)) represents the net flow of waste and emissions associated with the endoge-
nously determined levels of production-polluting and abatement activities. This flow is increas-
ing with respect to Y and decreasing with respect to B, i.e., P1 > 0 and P2 < 0. Function P (.)
is assumed homogeneous of degree zero, i.e., a proportionally equal increase in both output and
abatement leaves net emissions unchanged independently of the population size. Consequently,
the emissions function may be rewritten as P (Y (t),B (t)) = G
(
B(t)
Y (t)
)
, where we assume strict
concavity: G′ < 0, lim
x→0+
G′ ≤ 0, −∞ < lim
x→1−
G′ < 0, G′′ < 0, G (0) = GM > 0, and G (1) = 0.
Actually, GM > δSmax represents an effective upper limit for the emissions function, which is
high enough to lead the economy, if it prevails, to the state of ecological catastrophe. Now,
substituting the previous variable transformations into the differential equation for the motion
of the stock of pollutants we get
•
S (t) = G (1− z (t))− δ (t)S (t) , (10)
where Gz = −G′ > 0, 0 < lim
z→0+
Gz < +∞, lim
z→1−
Gz ≥ 0, and Gzz = G′′ < 0. Taking as reference
z = 1, which implies that no abatement effort is done and that emissions flow reaches the
maximum level GM , the larger the reduction in z the more effective the reduction in emissions.
The initial pollution stock is 0 < S (t0) = S0 < S
max.
A particular strictly concave emissions function which may be used in numerical simulations
is:
G (1− z (t)) = GM −GM (1− z (t))2 = GMz (t) (2− z (t)) . (11)
Moreover, the natural rate of regeneration is not an exogenously given constant parameter
but a variable which depends on the current population level. As explained in the introduction,
this is a key channel through which demographic conditions affect the environment. Concretely,
we hypothesize that the natural regeneration rate is strictly decreasing in the population level
δ (t) = δ (N (t)) , (12)
being δ′ (N) < 0 together with δ (N0) = δ0 > δ
(
N
)
= δ ≥ 0. In our framework, the
regeneration rate reaches a limit lowest value δ when population is maximal. This limit value
need not be zero as population size is always bounded. Moreover, the limit value need not
depend on N and may depend on many other several (unmodelled) long-term technological
and ecological factors. We shall come back to this issue in next sections.
A particular affine function for the rate of regeneration which may be used in numerical
simulations is
7
δ (N (t)) =
(
δ0 − δ
)(N −N (t)
N −N0
)
+ δ =
(
δ0 − δ
)
N
N0 exp (n (t− t0)) +
(
N −N0
) + δ. (13)
According to the aggregate resources constraint, net output may be devoted to consumption
or capital accumulation. For the sake of simplicity we do not consider capital deprecia-
tion. Hence, net investment equals gross investment and the capital stock is governed by the
differential equation
C(t) +
•
K(t) = Y (t)− B(t). (14)
This equation also reflects the cost of the abatement activity in a very simple way: one
additional unit of abatement effort is automatically ‘transformed’ into a lower unit of output
available for consumption or capital accumulation. This particular ‘one-to-one’ transformation
contributes to simplify our analysis.
Individual preferences are assumed to be represented by a twice continuously differentiable
instantaneous utility function V (c (t) , P (t)), which depends positively on the current per capita
consumption c and negatively on the polluting emissions flow P . Under this assumption,
households do not care about the stock of pollutants S accumulated in the environment and
the atmosphere, but only about the current net flow of polluting waste and emissions P .
This is because the local stock effect of pollution is assumed short-lived and the abatement
activity, which reduces emissions and facilitates regeneration, makes it negligible.2 On the
other hand, the assumed role for S and P in our model reflects the combined hypothesis of
either discontinuous and continuous dependence of damages on pollution (the abrupt damage
of a catastrophe via the stock S, and the marginal damage of pollution via the flow P ); Hence,
a non-zero marginal disutility shows that adverse effects occur even at pollution levels below
the critical threshold.
As we have previously shown, emissions depend positively on production and negatively on
pollution abatement, two variables that appear related to each other according to (8). Given
the characterization of the emissions function, P is an increasing monotonous transformation
of z. Therefore, the instantaneous utility function may be written as U (c(t), z(t)) with Uc > 0
and Uz < 0, where the two ordinal utility functions V and U represent the same preference
ordering. Moreover, we assume decreasing marginal utilities: Ucc < 0 and Uzz < 0, as well as
strict concavity with respect to both arguments taken together, UccUzz − (Ucz)2 > 0.
The structure of the model allows for the existence of a long-run balanced growth path,
defined as an allocation in which consumption per capita grows at a constant rate and the
2This also implies that we ignore any global stock effect in the representation of households’ preferences, but
this is because of the nature of the aggregate externality considered here. Following Weitzman (2007) in p. 713,
the damage associated with the global stock effect is not modeled entering the instantaneous utility function as
a direct argument, but as changing parameters of the intertemporal utility function. Nevertheless, an important
stream of literature considers that welfare depends on the stock of pollution rather than on the current flow
(see Hang and Cab, 1994, Mohair, 1996, or Byrne, 1997). However, if the flow of pollution is increasing with
production, then capital accumulation that increases future output also increases future flows of pollution. All
in all, we have now a general consensus in the literature (Gradus and Smulders, 1993, or Reis, 2001) according
to which, if we consider the stock of pollution as an argument in the utility function, we will obtain the same
fundamental long-run results but at the cost of a more complex analysis. Only transitional dynamics would
change significantly if pollution stock is directly involved in preferences. In any case, our interest here is in the
long-run dynamics.
8
dirtiness index is constant. To ensure that such a path may exist in this model we assume that
the particular instantaneous utility function is multiplicatively separable and of the CIES form
U (c(t), z(t)) =
c(t)1−Φ
1− Φ (1− z(t))
α(1−Φ) . (15)
In this function, the parameter α
(
≡ U1−z
Uc
1−z
c
= −Uz
Uc
1−z
c
)
represents the relative weight of
environmental care in utility and is assumed to be positive and lower than one, 0 < α < 1.
Moreover, the inverse of the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution3 is allowed to
take values above or below unity, 0 < Φ ≶ 1. The previous utility function fulfills all the
above mentioned assumptions concerning first and second derivatives. The strict concavity
assumption requires as sufficient condition that the determinant of the Hessian matrix be
positive, which implies the additional parameter constraint Φ > α
1+α
.4
3 The optimal sustainable growth problem
In the optimal sustainable growth problem, the benevolent planner has to consider, on one
hand, the true social costs and benefits from pollution abatement and, on the other, he has to
take into account the global negative effect from an eventual ecological catastrophe associated
with the accumulated stock of pollutants, that is the existence of a pollution ceiling. In this
setting, we define social welfare (which is the objective function of the planner) as
W =
∫ +∞
t0
c1−Φ
1− Φ (1− z)
α(1−Φ)Nλe−ρ(t−t0)dt if S (τ) 6 Smax ∀τ
W c =
∫ tc
t0
c1−Φ
1− Φ (1− z)
α(1−Φ)Nλe−ρ(t−t0)dt if S (τ) > Smax ∀τ > tc (16)
where tc < +∞ represents the date the pollution ceiling is reached. Beyond Smax, it is implicitly
assumed that welfare drops to zero. Parameter ρ is the social rate of time preference or discount
rate. Parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] contributes to specify preferences, which are represented using
a Millian, an intermediate, or a Benthamite intertemporal utility function. In one extreme,
when λ = 0 (average utilitarianism), the central planner maximizes per capita utility (average
utility of consumption per capita). In the other, when λ = 1 (classical utilitarianism), central
3From now on, intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) will refer to the conventional IES coefficient
given by −Ucc·Ucc =
1
Φ , because the utility function (15) shows a long-run IES coefficient given by
1
Φ−α(1−Φ) .
4Environmental literature has long dealt with the sign of the second order cross derivative of the instantaneous
utility function (Michel and Rotillon, 1995, or Mohtadi, 1996). From U
(
c(t), B(t)Y (t)
)
we know that utility
indirectly depends on the environmental quality, which increases with abatement effort scaled by economy’s
dimension. The latter can be measured by output as well as by capital stock, given the linear form of the
production function. In the particular case of equation (15) we get Uc2 = −Ucz = α(1−Φ)c−Φ (1− z)α(1−Φ)−1,
which is negative (positive) as long as Φ is greater (smaller) than one. That is, as long as the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is smaller (greater) than one. Empirical evidence seems to corroborate the case of
a low intertemporal elasticity of substitution and, hence, Uc2 < 0. This implies that the marginal utility of
consumption decreases as the environmental quality increases. Namely, consumption and pollution emissions
are complements in terms of preferences. However, the model works exactly the same in the opposite case in
which Uc2 > 0.
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planner maximizes total utility (the addition across total population of utilities of per capita
consumption).5
If the central planner is intended to maximizing social welfare, he can reach this target by
maximizing W subject to the constraint S (t) 6 Smax. The corresponding dynamic optimization
problem is thus formulated introducing an explicit constraint, the no-catastrophe condition as
a pollution ceiling restriction, which implies that the central planner takes care ex-ante of
trajectories leading to catastrophic states and optimally decides to avoid them by choosing the
controls appropriately. A comprehensive account of all state and control constraints leads to
list
(i) z (t) > 0,
(ii) 1− z (t) > 0, (17)
(iii) S (t) 6 Smax,
which add to the usual dynamic and boundary constraints for K and S. The third kind of
constraint in (17) is a pure state constraint. It can be treated using a well-known textbook
technique (see for example, Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1987, Chap 5, Theorem 4). Concretely,
writing the current stock in per capita and efficiency units, s˜ (t) = S(t)
A(t)N(t)
, we get Smax −
A (t)N (t) s˜ (t) > 0, and given that A (t)N (t) s˜ (t) is not allowed to exceed Smax, one can
extract the following new condition when the state constraint is binding
d (A (t)N (t) s˜ (t))
dt
= A (t)N (t) (g˜ (1− z (t))− δ (t) s˜ (t)) 6 0
whenever A (t)N (t) s˜ (t) = Smax, (18)
where we have made use of the equation representing the motion of the stock of pollutants in
per capita and efficiency terms, i.e.
•
s˜ (t) = g˜ (1− z (t))− (δ (t) + x (t) + n (t)) s˜ (t).6
Hence, the planner’s problem consists in choosing the sequence {c (t) , z (t) , t ≥ t0} which,
for a given positive social rate of discount ρ > n, solve the optimization problem
max
{K,S,c,z}
∫ +∞
t0
c1−Φ
1− Φ (1− z)
α(1−Φ)Nλe−ρ(t−t0)dt
5The literature differentiates between two types of altruism depending on the two parameters ρ and λ. The
first one is intertemporal altruism and depends on the discount rate applied to future population utility. The
second one is intergenerational altruism and depends on the number of individuals which is taken into account
each period. In particular, for representative and infinitely lived agent models, parameter λ controls for the
degree of altruism towards total population including future generations. When agents are (partially) selfish,
λ = 0, they care only about per capita utility (current and future), and the size of population has no direct effect
on the intertemporal utility. Instead, when agents are (almost perfectly) altruistic, λ = 1, they care not only
about their own utility but also about that of their dynasties. In this case, the intertemporal utility function
includes total population as a determinant, regardless of its value in the future. When 0 < λ < 1 agents show
an intermediate degree of intergenerational altruism.
6Recall that G (1− z) is a strictly concave function representing the aggregate emissions flow, which depends
positively on the dirtiness index z. Hence, the function g˜ (1− z), which represents the efficiency per capita
emissions flow, preserves the characterization attributed to the aggregate function: g˜′ < 0, lim
x→0+
g˜′ ≤ 0, −∞ <
lim
x→1−
g˜′ < 0, g˜′′ < 0, GM > g˜ (0) = GMA(t)N(t) > 0, and g˜ (1) = 0. Moreover, g˜z = −g˜′ > 0, 0 < lim
z→0+
g˜z < +∞,
lim
z→1−
g˜z ≥ 0, and g˜zz = g˜′′ < 0.
10
s.t. (1), (2), (5), (8), (9), (10), (12), (14), (17) and (18), (19)
given A (t0) = A0 > 0, K (t0) = K0 > 0, N (t0) = N0 > 0 and S (t0) = S0 > 0.
Now we define variables c˜ (t) = c(t)
A(t)
and k˜ (t) = K(t)
A(t)N(t)
in per capita and efficiency terms.
Then, the general dynamic optimization problem may be written as in the following current
value (generalized) Hamiltonian
Hc
{c˜,z,q,k˜,µ,s˜,η,θ}
=
c˜1−Φ (1− z)α(1−Φ)
1− Φ A
1−ΦNλ + q
(
zk˜β − c˜− (x+ n) k˜
)
+µ (g˜ (1− z)− (δ + x+ n) s˜) + η (1− z)− θAN (g˜ (1− z)− δs˜) . (20)
Here, q and µ are the co-states for k˜ and s˜ respectively, and η and θ are Lagrangian
multipliers associated with the constraint on the control-variable z and the constraint on the
state-variable S respectively. Both η and θ are dynamic multipliers because their corresponding
constraints must be satisfied at every period t. Given that the control inequality constraint is
linear, the first order necessary conditions arising from Pontryagin’s principle and Kuhn-Tucker
theorem are
q = c˜−Φ (1− z)α(1−Φ)A1−ΦNλ, (21)
qk˜β + µg˜z − η − θANg˜z − αc˜
1−Φ (1− z)α(1−Φ)
1− z A
1−ΦNλ 6 0,
z > 0, z
(
qk˜β + µg˜z − η − θANg˜z − αc˜1−Φ(1−z)
α(1−Φ)
1−z A
1−ΦNλ
)
= 0, (22)
•
k˜ = zk˜β − c˜− (x+ n) k˜, (23)
•
q = (ρ+ x+ n) q − βzk˜β−1q, (24)
•
s˜ = g˜ (1− z)− (δ + x+ n) s˜, (25)
•
µ = (ρ+ δ + x+ n)µ− δANθ, (26)
1− z > 0, η > 0, η (1− z) = 0, (27)
g˜ (1− z)− δs˜ 6 0, θ > 0, θ (g˜ (1− z)− δs˜) = 0, (28)
where
A (t) =
A0
A0
A
+
(
1− A0
A
)
exp (−x (t− t0))
, (29)
x (t) =
x
(
A− A0
)
A0 exp (x (t− t0)) +
(
A− A0
) , (30)
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N (t) =
N0
N0
N
+
(
1− N0
N
)
exp (−n (t− t0))
, (31)
n (t) =
n
(
N −N0
)
N0 exp (n (t− t0)) +
(
N −N0
) . (32)
To make clear that (26), (27), and (28) only apply when A (t)N (t) s˜ (t) = Smax we append
the complementary-slackness condition and the restriction on the way θ changes over time (see
again Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1987, Chap 5, Theorem 4)
S 6 Smax, θ (S − Smax) = 0,
•
θ 6 0 (= 0 when S < Smax) . (33)
Finally, we also need the initial conditions k˜0 and s˜0, and the transversality conditions
lim
t→+∞
e−ρ(t−t0)qk˜ = 0, (34)
lim
t→+∞
e−ρ(t−t0)µs˜ = 0. (35)
These necessary conditions are also sufficient for a maximum because the Hamiltonian
function satisfies the required concavity conditions.
Using the particular functions (11) and (13) we get the following explicit relationships which
will be useful later
g˜ (1− z) = G
M
AN
(
1− (1− z)2) (36)
g˜z =
2GM
AN
(1− z) (37)
δ (t) =
(
δ0 − δ
)
N
N0 exp (n (t− t0)) +
(
N −N0
) + δ (38)
As one can see, the problem is analytically highly complex, it gives rise to the dynamic
system (21)-(35) which is clearly intractable in many respects. Indeed, the system is not only
nonlinear and simultaneous but it is also non-autonomous, given the assumed technological and
demographic laws of motion. This said, we show hereafter that a partial analytical characteri-
zation is still possible although far nontrivial. First of all, we shall start by characterizing (as
finely as we can) the non-binding regime, that is the case where the trajectories stay below
the pollution ceiling permanently (Section 4). We then do the same when the economy lies on
the binding regime (Section 5). In both cases, we try to characterize the long term dynamics
in closed-form. It’s worth pointing out here that if the exogenous variables, A(t) and N(t)
were exponential functions, writing variables in efficiency units (that’s dividing them by the
product A(t)N(t)) would render the considered dynamic system autonomous with constant
steady state solutions. In our benchmark model, both technology and population follow logistic
curves, and such a transformation does not make the system autonomous. Constant steady
state solutions only exist asymptotically. This will be quite apparent throughout the rest of
the paper.
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4 The non-binding regime
When the static constraints (17) of the previous optimization problem are non-binding, 0 <
z (t) < 1 and S (t) < Smax, then θ = 0,
•
θ = 0 and η = 0
q = c˜−Φ (1− z)α(1−Φ)A1−ΦNλ, (39)
qk˜β + µ
2GM
AN
(1− z)− αc˜
1−Φ (1− z)α(1−Φ)
1− z A
1−ΦNλ = 0, (40)
•
k˜ = zk˜β − c˜− (x+ n) k˜, (41)
•
q = (ρ+ x+ n) q − βzk˜β−1q, (42)
•
s˜ =
GM
AN
(
1− (1− z)2)− (δ + x+ n) s˜, (43)
•
µ = (ρ+ δ + x+ n)µ, (44)
Together with the initial conditions k˜0 and s˜0, and the transversality conditions
lim
t→+∞
e−ρ(t−t0)q (t) k˜ (t) = 0, (45)
lim
t→+∞
e−ρ(t−t0)µ (t)
S (t)
A (t)N (t)
= 0. (46)
Moreover, there is also the exogenous dynamics given by trajectories (29), (30), (31), (32),
and (38).
Next, after some preliminary algebraic manipulations, we characterize the long term equi-
libria associated with this regime (assuming that it is permanent) and we end up identifying
a sufficient condition under which this regime cannot be optimally permanent, which we will
validate moving to the second regime, the binding regime.
First of all, we take equation (44) getting as solution
µ (t) = µ (t0) e
∫ t
t0
(ρ+δ+x+n)dτ
= µ (t0) e
(ρ+δ)(t−t0)
(
N (t)
N0
) δ0−δ
n
(
1−N0
N
)
A (t)
A0
N (t)
N0
. (47)
Second, we integrate (43) and obtain the expression
S (t) =
e−δ(t−t0)(N (t)
N0
) −(δ0−δ)
n
(
1−N0
N
)

S0 + ∫ t
t0
GMz (τ) (2− z (τ))
(
N (τ)
N0
) δ0−δ
n
(
1−N0
N
)
eδ(τ−t0)dτ
 .
(48)
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Finally, substituting both expressions into the transversality condition (46) it results that
µ (t0)
A0N0
S0 +
∫ ∞
t0
GMz (τ) (2− z (τ))
(
N (τ)
N0
) δ0−δ
n
(
1−N0
N
)
eδ(τ−t0)dτ
 = 0. (49)
And this condition holds if, and only if, µ (t0) = 0 because the integral on the r.h.s. cannot
be negative. Consequently, we may conclude that, ∀t ≥ t0,
µ (t) = 0. (50)
This result implies that even if the central planner internalizes all the pollution-based ex-
ternalities, he optimally assigns zero value to the social shadow price of the accumulated stock
of pollutants.
Our equations can be further reduced to
c˜ = α
α(1−Φ)
Φ−α(1−Φ)
(
A1−ΦNλ
) 1
Φ−α(1−Φ) q
−1
Φ−α(1−Φ) k˜
−βα(1−Φ)
Φ−α(1−Φ) , (51)
z = 1− α ΦΦ−α(1−Φ) (A1−ΦNλ) 1Φ−α(1−Φ) q −1Φ−α(1−Φ) k˜ −βΦΦ−α(1−Φ) , (52)
•
k˜ = − (x+ n) k˜ + k˜β −
(
α
Φ
Φ−α(1−Φ) + α
α(1−Φ)
Φ−α(1−Φ)
) (
A1−ΦNλ
) 1
Φ−α(1−Φ) q
−1
Φ−α(1−Φ) k˜
−βα(1−Φ)
Φ−α(1−Φ) , (53)
•
q = (ρ+ x+ n) q − βqk˜β−1 + βα ΦΦ−α(1−Φ) (A1−ΦNλ) 1Φ−α(1−Φ) q −1Φ−α(1−Φ) +1k˜ −βα(1−Φ)Φ−α(1−Φ)−1, (54)
lim
t→+∞
e−ρ(t−t0)q (t) k˜ (t) = 0, (55)
•
s˜ =
GM
AN
(
1− (1− z)2)− (δ + x+ n) s˜, (56)
S (t) < Smax, (57)
together with (29)-(32) and (38). We are now able to investigate the existence of long term
equilibria assuming that the non-binding regime is permanent.
4.1 The stationary equilibria
Because of the exogenous logistic dynamics for technology and demography, the dynamic sys-
tems depicted above are nonlinear non-autonomous despite variables are written in efficiency
units. Accordingly, we cannot define stationary equilibria as traditionally (that’s by zeroing the
time derivatives of the variables written in efficiency units). We shall proceed heuristically to
uncover the long-term behaviour of the solution paths taking into account that both technology
and population size converge to finite values when t tends to infinity. Suppose that A and N are
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equal to their steady state values, A = A¯, N = N¯ and n = x = 0. Then, applying to equations
(53)-(54), with A and N fixed to the latter values, the stationarity conditions
•
k˜ =
•
q = 0
0 = k˜∗β −
(
α
Φ
Φ−α(1−Φ) + α
α(1−Φ)
Φ−α(1−Φ)
) (
A¯1−ΦN¯λ
) 1
Φ−α(1−Φ) q∗
−1
Φ−α(1−Φ) k˜∗
−βα(1−Φ)
Φ−α(1−Φ) , (58)
0 = ρq∗ − βq∗k˜∗β−1 + βα ΦΦ−α(1−Φ) (A¯1−ΦN¯λ) 1Φ−α(1−Φ) q∗ −1Φ−α(1−Φ) +1k˜∗−βα(1−Φ)Φ−α(1−Φ)−1. (59)
one gets
k˜∞ =
(
β
(1 + α) ρ
) 1
1−β
, (60)
and
q∗∞ =
(
α
Φ
Φ−α(1−Φ) + α
α(1−Φ)
Φ−α(1−Φ)
)Φ−α(1−Φ)
A
1−Φ
N
λ
(
(1 + α) ρ
β
) βΦ
1−β
. (61)
Heuristically, one can also visualize the “long-term trajectories” of both variables when technol-
ogy and demography approach their steady state values. These trajectories will be most useful
in the numerical solution of the model. It’s enough to apply again to equations (53)-(54), with
A and N tending to their limit values, the stationarity conditions
•
k˜ =
•
q = 0. One gets
k˜∗ (t) =
(
β
(1 + α) ρ+ (1 + α (1− β)) (x (t) + n (t))
) 1
1−β
, (62)
and
q∗ (t) =
(
α
Φ
Φ−α(1−Φ) + α
α(1−Φ)
Φ−α(1−Φ)
)Φ−α(1−Φ)
A (t)1−Φ N (t)λ
· 1
β
βΦ
1−β
((1 + α) ρ+ (1 + α (1− β)) (x (t) + n (t)))Φ−(1−β)α(1−Φ)1−β
((1 + α) ρ+ (1 + α) (1− β) (x (t) + n (t)))Φ−α(1−Φ)
. (63)
One can easily check that:
k˜∗∞ ≡ lim
t→+∞
k˜∗ (t) , (64)
and
q∗∞ ≡ lim
t→+∞
q∗ (t) (65)
We can proceed in the same heuristic way to characterize the “long-term” trajectories of
the controls:
c˜∗ (t) = β
β
1−β
ρ+ (1− β) (x (t) + n (t))
((1 + α) ρ+ (1 + α (1− β)) (x (t) + n (t))) 11−β
, (66)
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c˜∗∞ ≡ lim
t→+∞
c˜∗ (t) =
1
1 + α
(
β
(1 + α) ρ
) β
1−β
, (67)
0 < z∗ (t) =
ρ+ x (t) + n (t)
(1 + α) ρ+ (1 + α (1− β)) (x (t) + n (t)) < 1, (68)
0 < z∗∞ ≡ lim
t→+∞
z∗ (t) =
1
1 + α
< 1. (69)
From the above expressions, we also get the heuristic long-term trajectories for some addi-
tional variables
c˜∗ (t)
k˜∗ (t)
=
ρ+ (1− β) (x (t) + n (t))
β
, (70)
lim
t→+∞
c˜∗ (t)
k˜∗ (t)
=
ρ
β
, (71)
K∗ (t) = A (t)N (t)
(
β
(1 + α) ρ+ (1 + α (1− β)) (x (t) + n (t))
) 1
1−β
, (72)
K∗∞ ≡ lim
t→+∞
K∗ (t) = AN
(
β
(1 + α) ρ
) 1
1−β
, (73)
c∗ (t) = A (t) β
β
1−β
ρ+ (1− β) (x (t) + n (t))
((1 + α) ρ+ (1 + α (1− β)) (x (t) + n (t))) 11−β
, (74)
c∗∞ ≡ lim
t→+∞
c∗ (t) =
A
1 + α
(
β
(1 + α) ρ
) β
1−β
. (75)
Finally, using (48), one can do the same for the aggregate stock of pollutants S
S∗ (t) =
(
N0
N
+
(
1− N0
N
)
exp (−n (t− t0))
) δ0−δ
n
(
1−N0
N
)
·
S0e−δ(t−t0) +
∫ t
t0
GMz∗ (τ) (2− z∗ (τ)) e−δ(t−τ)(
N0
N
+
(
1− N0
N
)
exp (−n (τ − t0))
) δ0−δ
n
(
1−N0
N
) dτ
 , (76)
where
0 < z∗ (t) (2− z∗ (t)) = 1−
(
αρ+ α (1− β) (x (t) + n (t))
(1 + α) ρ+ (1 + α (1− β)) (x (t) + n (t))
)2
< 1. (77)
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4.2 The ecological catastrophe
It’s now possible to derive conditions under which the non-binding regime cannot be permanent,
implying the optimal switch to a regime where pollution stock is equal to its ceiling. Indeed,
given that x (t) and n (t) are both monotonous decreasing functions, and that ∂z
∗
∂(x+n)
> 0, and
provided that ∂[z
∗(2−z∗)]
∂z∗ > 0 ∀ 0 < z∗ < 1, one may conclude that
S∗ (t) ≥ Sm (t) ≡
(
N0
N
+
(
1− N0
N
)
exp (−n (t− t0))
) δ0−δ
n
(
1−N0
N
)
·
S0e−δ(t−t0) +GM 1 + 2α(1 + α)2
∫ t
t0
e−δ(t−τ)(
N0
N
+
(
1− N0
N
)
exp (−n (τ − t0))
) δ0−δ
n
(
1−N0
N
) dτ
 . (78)
The previous integral has an explicit solution in terms of the Gaussian Hypergeometric
function ∫ t
t0
e−δ(t−τ)(
N0
N
+
(
1− N0
N
)
exp (−n (τ − t0))
) δ0−δ
n
(
1−N0
N
) dτ
=
1
δ
 1 +
(
N
N0
− 1
)
exp (−n (t− t0))
N0
N
+
(
1− N0
N
)
exp (−n (t− t0))

δ0−δ
n
(
1−N0
N
)
2F1(a, b, 1 + a; d exp (−n (t− t0)))
−e
−δ(t−t0)
δ
(
N
N0
) δ0−δ
n
(
1−N0
N
)
2F1(a, b, 1 + a; d), (79)
where a = − δ
n
, b = δ0−δ
n
(
1−N0
N
) , and d = (1− N
N0
)
.
This solution converges to
lim
t→+∞
∫ t
t0
e−δ(t−τ)(
N0
N
+
(
1− N0
N
)
exp (−n (τ − t0))
) δ0−δ
n
(
1−N0
N
) dτ =
1
δ
(
N
N0
) δ0−δ
n
(
1−N0
N
)
2F1(a, b, 1 + a; 0),
(80)
where 2F1(a, b, 1 + a; 0) = 1. Consequently, we get
S∗∞ ≡ lim
t→+∞
S∗ (t) = lim
t→+∞
Sm (t) =
GM
δ
1 + 2α
(1 + α)2
. (81)
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Then, a sufficient condition for the catastrophe, S (t) > Smax, is
GM
1 + 2α
(1 + α)2
> δSmax, (82)
where 0.75 < 1+2α
(1+α)2
< 1 because 1 > α > 0.
Recall that 1+2α
(1+α)2
= z∗∞ (2− z∗∞). So condition (82) is straightforward. In particular, a
catastrophe is more likely to occur if (i) the pollution ceiling is low enough, (ii) if the asymp-
totic regeneration rate (the minimal value of this rate) is low enough, and (iii) if the emissions
parameter GM is large enough. It is interesting to visualize the potential demographic con-
nections in this picture. First of all, and though we have been agnostic in this respect so far,
the asymptotic regeneration rate δ may depend on maximal population N : naturally enough,
and though this rate depends on many other potential factors as argued before, it is likely to
be a decreasing function of N . As such a larger population in the long-run favors ecological
catastrophes. Second, when taking the model to the data (see Section 7), GM is captured by
emissions indicators, and more precisely by emissions to GDP indicators. Therefore, a larger
N would also increase the likelihood of a catastrophe. These scenarios are evaluated using UN
projections in Section 7.
5 The case where the pollution ceiling is reached
If the sufficient condition identified just above holds, then pollution ceiling is reached and
another regime (with binding state constraint) will set it. We shall characterize it hereafter.
It is worth pointing out at this stage that in contrast to alternative optimal growth models
with pollution ceiling (Amigues and Moreaux, 2013, includes another control as the extraction
rate of nonrenewable resources but it could be investment in a backstop technology), which
deliver optimal routes to leave the binding regime after a while, no such a route is possible
here. Indeed, when the ceiling is reached the economy stays in this regime forever. We shall
give hereafter some details on how this works.
Consider that we find S (tc) = Smax for some +∞ > tc > t0. This implies that the absolute
limit to growth, i.e. the ecological and economic catastrophe, appears as a binding constraint
in finite time. In what follows we pay special attention to this case and we study the first
order conditions at that moment and thereafter. The way the central planner can avoid the
catastrophic at the lower cost in welfare terms is by keeping S constant,
S (t) = S (tc) = Smax ∀t > tc. (83)
That is,
•
S (t) = 0 ∀t > tc. Hence, G(1− z (tc)) = δ (tc)S∗ (tc) = δ (tc)Smax and, given the
particular functions assumed in (11) and (13), we get
z (tc)2 − 2z (tc) +

(
δ0 − δ
)
N
N0 exp (n (tc − t0)) +
(
N −N0
) + δ
 Smax
GM
= 0. (84)
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Consequently, at tc the dirtiness index, a variable which admits jumps, will take the value
0 < z (tc) = 1−
√√√√√1−

(
δ0 − δ
)
N
N0 exp (n (tc − t0)) +
(
N −N0
) Smax
GM
+
δSmax
GM
 < 1, (85)
irrespective of its value in previous periods. This means that at tc the central planner may
optimally decide, if necessary, a discrete and instantaneous change in the dirtiness index to the
previous z (tc). Moreover, from (27) we get η (tc) = 0.
However, beyond tc population still grows according to (6) and, consequently, the rate of
regeneration of the pollution stock diminishes according to (13). The process continues until
population eventually reaches the carrying capacity N , and the rate of natural regeneration
eventually catches up with the minimum constant rate δ. During this period of time, to
guarantee
•
S (t) = 0 we need that z (t) changes according to
0 < z (t) = 1−
√√√√√1−

(
δ (tc)− δ
)
N
N (tc) exp (n (t− tc)) +
(
N −N (tc)
) Smax
GM
+
δSmax
GM
 < 1 ∀t > tc,
(86)
0 < z∞ = lim
t→+∞
z (t) = 1−
√
1− δS
max
GM
< 1. (87)
Therefore η (t) = 0 ∀t > tc. On other hand, condition (83) also implies g˜ (1− z (t)) =
δ (t) s˜ (t) ∀t > tc. Under (28) and (33), one gets θ (t) > 0 and
•
θ (t) 6 0 ∀t > tc. This means
that in case θ = 0 then
•
θ = 0, and in case θ > 0 then
•
θ 6 0. In other words, θ can be only nil,
positive constant or positive decreasing forever.
From (25) and (28) the dynamic equation for s˜ becomes
•
s˜ = − (x+ n) s˜, from which we get
s˜ (t) = s˜ (tc) e−
∫ t
tc (x(τ)+n(τ))dτ ∀t > tc. (88)
Moreover, the solution to the dynamic equation (26) is
µ (t) = e
∫ t
tc (ρ+δ(τ)+x(τ)+n(τ))dτ
[
µ (tc)−
∫ t
tc
δ ()A ()N () θ () e−
∫ 
tc (ρ+δ(α)+x(α)+n(α))dαd
]
∀t > tc.
(89)
The path for the shadow price µ couples to such of the stock s˜, and the transversality
condition (35) holds if, and only if,
µ (tc) = A (tc)N (tc)
δ(tc)−δ
n
(
1−N(tc)
N
)+1 ∫ +∞
tc
δ (τ) θ (τ)N (τ)
− δ(t
c)−δ
n
(
1−N(tc)
N
)
e−(ρ+δ)(τ−t
c)dτ . (90)
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The previous integral is bounded. The integrand, which is the product of three non-negative
non-increasing terms times the enlarged discount factor, converges to zero. Consequently, we
find that
µ (t) =
∫ +∞
t
δ (τ)A (τ)N (τ) θ (τ) e−
∫ τ
t (ρ+δ(r)+x(r)+n(r))drdτ
= A (t)N (t)
δ(t)−δ
n
(
1−N(t)
N
)+1 ∫ +∞
t
δ (τ) θ (τ)N (τ)
− δ(t)−δ
n
(
1−N(t)
N
)
e−(ρ+δ)(τ−t)dτ > 0 ∀t > tc. (91)
As expected, µ (t) 6= 0 ∀t > tc because all along this interval of time the pure state-space
constraint is binding and, in the corresponding corner solution, the central planner optimally
assigns a positive value to the social shadow price of the accumulated stock of pollutants.
The remaining first order conditions are
c˜ =
(
(1− z)α(1−Φ)A1−ΦNλ
q
) 1
Φ
, (92)
•
k˜ = − (x+ n) k˜ + zk˜β −
(
(1− z)α(1−Φ)A1−ΦNλ
) 1
Φ
q−
1
Φ , (93)
•
q = (ρ+ x+ n) q − βzqk˜β−1, (94)
where
A (t) =
A (tc)
A(tc)
A
+
(
1− A(tc)
A
)
exp (−x (t− tc))
, (95)
x (t) =
x
(
1− A(tc)
A
)
A(tc)
A
exp (x (t− tc )) +
(
1− A(tc)
A
) , (96)
N (t) =
N (tc)
N(tc)
N
+
(
1− N(tc)
N
)
exp (−n (t− tc))
, (97)
n (t) =
n
(
1− N(tc)
N
)
N(tc)
N
exp (n (t− tc)) +
(
1− N(tc)
N
) , (98)
δ (t) =
(
δ (tc)− δ
)( N −N (t)
N −N (tc)
)
+ δ =
δ (tc)− δ
N(tc)
N
exp (n (t− tc)) +
(
1− N(tc)
N
) + δ. (99)
Together with the initial condition k˜0 and the transversality condition
lim
t→+∞
e−ρ(t−t
c)q (t) k˜ (t) = 0. (100)
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5.1 Stationary equilibria when pollution ceiling is binding
Using the same methodology as in Section 4.1, one can compute the “long-term” trajectories
of the variables in the binding case. Based on equations (93)-(94), one gets:
k˜∗ (t) =
(
βz (t)
ρ+ x (t) + n (t)
) 1
1−β
, (101)
k˜∗∞ ≡ lim
t→+∞
k˜∗ (t) =
(
βz∞
ρ
) 1
1−β
, (102)
q∗ (t) =
(1− z (t))α(1−Φ)A (t)1−Φ N (t)λ(
z (t) k˜∗ (t)β − (x (t) + n (t)) k˜∗ (t)
)Φ , (103)
q∗∞ ≡ lim
t→+∞
q∗ (t) =
(1− z∞)α(1−Φ)A
1−Φ
N
λ
z
Φ
1−β∞
(
ρ
β
) βΦ
1−β
, (104)
c˜∗ (t) = z (t) k˜∗ (t)β − (x (t) + n (t)) k˜∗ (t) , (105)
c˜∗∞ ≡ lim
t→+∞
c˜∗ (t) = z
1
1−β∞
(
β
ρ
) β
1−β
, (106)
c˜∗ (t)
k˜∗ (t)
=
ρ+ (1− β) (x (t) + n (t))
β
, (107)
lim
t→+∞
c˜∗ (t)
k˜∗ (t)
=
ρ
β
, (108)
K∗ (t) = A (t)N (t)
(
βz (t)
ρ+ x (t) + n (t)
) 1
1−β
, (109)
K∗∞ ≡ lim
t→+∞
K∗ (t) = AN
(
βz∞
ρ
) 1
1−β
, (110)
c∗ (t) = z (t)A (t) k˜∗ (t)β − (x (t) + n (t))A (t) k˜∗ (t) , (111)
and
c∗∞ ≡ lim
t→+∞
c∗ (t) = Az
1
1−β∞
(
β
ρ
) β
1−β
. (112)
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5.2 Long-term environmental quality and consumption per capita
in the nonbinding vs binding regime
A useful exercise to understand the optimal solution and the associated optimal sustainable
policy is to compare the long-run values for the dirtiness index and consumption per capita
obtained for each regime (if they were permanent), both involved in welfare evaluations. A first
important result that can be obtained is that the optimal policy operated when the ecological
ceiling is reached is unambiguously stricter in the sense that abatement is clearly larger in the
latter case yielding a better environmental quality (or in other words, a lower value for z∞).
This can be proved readily. Assume (82):
1 + 2α
(1 + α)2
>
δSmax
GM
,
which implies that the economy optimally reaches the ceiling value for pollution in a finite time.
Since, by (87), the asymptotic value of the dirtiness index is in this case
z∞ = 1−
√
1− δS
max
GM
,
the following inequality holds
z∞ < 1−
√
1− 1 + 2α
(1 + α)2
,
which exactly yields
z∞ <
1
1 + α
.
Since any solution in the non-binding regime converges to z∗∞ =
1
1+α
by (69), it follows as
announced that when reaching the pollution ceiling, the environmental constraint requires a
much stringer abatement policy, resulting in a clearly better environmental quality asymptoti-
cally (and better welfare everything equal elsewhere) than under any non-binding regime.
One could also compare the two regimes with respect to the asymptotic consumption per
capita. According to (75), this value for the non-binding regime is equal to A
(
1
1+α
) 1
1−β
(
β
ρ
) β
1−β
.
For the binding regime, the counterpart is given exactly by equation (112) as equal toAz
1
1−β∞
(
β
ρ
) β
1−β
.
Since we have just proved above that z∞ < 11+α , it follows that asymptotic consumption
per capita in the binding regime is lower. This is the cost of fighting pollution at its ceiling
level. This drop in consumption when the ceiling level is reached is quite common in the related
literature of sustainable growth as documented in Amigues and Moreaux (2013).
6 The case of exponential technological progress
Now we consider a departure from the benchmark analysis conducted so far, and introduce
the exponential law of motion for technology as it is typically the case in neoclassical growth
theory. We keep population dynamics logistic. Concretely we assume
A (t) = A0 exp (x (t− t0)) , (113)
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where x ≥ 0 is the rate of technical progress. Function δ (·) is defined again as in Section 2.
Because technology is exogenously exponential, all variables (except z) will exhibit exponential
growth asymptotically. We therefore detrend these variables, or in other terms, we rewrite them
in efficiency units as we have been doing from Section 3. Following exactly the same steps as
before, we are able to characterize the long-run dynamics and asymptotic values for the key
variables in the non-binding regime. That is, to identify a sufficient condition for the emergence
of the binding regime and then again deduce the corresponding long-run trajectories and the
associated asymptotic long-run values for the relevant economic variables. Here we concentrate
on the non-binding regime to unburden the exposition, the main objective of this section being
comparison with the benchmark “logistic” model. Using the same heuristic methodology as in
Section 4.1, we hereafter list the “long term” dynamics and associated asymptotic values for
capital, consumption per capita (both in efficiency units), the dirtiness index and the stock of
pollution:
k˜∗III (t) =
(
β
(1 + α) ρ+ (Φ− α (β − Φ))x+ (1 + α (1− β))n (t)
) 1
1−β
, (114)
lim
t→+∞
k˜∗III (t) =
(
β
(1 + α) ρ+ (Φ− α (β − Φ))x
) 1
1−β
, (115)
c˜∗III (t) =
β
β
1−β
(1 + α)
(1 + α) ρ+ (Φ− α (β − Φ)− β)x+ (1 + α) (1− β)n (t)
((1 + α) ρ+ (Φ− α (β − Φ))x+ (1 + α (1− β))n (t)) 11−β
, (116)
lim
t→+∞
c˜∗III (t) =
β
β
1−β
(1 + α)
(1 + α) ρ+ (Φ− α (β − Φ)− β)x
((1 + α) ρ+ (Φ− α (β − Φ))x) 11−β
, (117)
z∗III (t) = 1−
α
1 + α
(1 + α) ρ+ (Φ− α (β − Φ)− β)x+ (1 + α) (1− β)n (t)
(1 + α) ρ+ (Φ− α (β − Φ))x+ (1 + α (1− β))n (t) , (118)
lim
t→+∞
z∗III (t) = 1−
α
1 + α
(1 + α) ρ+ (Φ− α (β − Φ)− β)x
(1 + α) ρ+ (Φ− α (β − Φ))x , (119)
and
S∗III (t) =
(
N0
N
+
(
1− N0
N
)
exp (−n (t− t0))
) δ0−δ
n
(
1−N0
N
)
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·S0e−δ(t−t0) +
∫ t
t0
GMz∗III (τ) (2− z∗III (τ)) e−δ(t−τ)(
N0
N
+
(
1− N0
N
)
exp (−n (τ − t0))
) δ0−δ
n
(
1−N0
N
) dτ
 , (120)
where
z∗III (t) (2− z∗III (t)) = 1−
(
α
1 + α
(1 + α) ρ+ (Φ− α (β − Φ)− β)x+ (1 + α) (1− β)n (t)
(1 + α) ρ+ (Φ− α (β − Φ))x+ (1 + α (1− β))n (t)
)2
,
(121)
lim
t→+∞
S∗III (t) =
GM
δ
(
1−
(
α
1 + α
(1 + α) ρ+ (Φ− α (β − Φ)− β)x
(1 + α) ρ+ (Φ− α (β − Φ))x
)2)
. (122)
We now compare the asymptotic values of these variables with their counterpart in Section
4, the optimal outcomes in the non-binding case when technological progress is logistic.7 Let
us start with the dirtiness index given by equation (119). It is easy to check that we get the
dirtiness index value corresponding to the logistic case given by equation (69) when x = 0.
Since the latter is typically a small number, it is easy to visualize the impact of exponential
growth by looking at the sign of the derivative of the dirtiness index given by (119) at x = 0.
In a similar way this is also checked for (per capita and in efficiency units) physical capital and
consumption, shown in equations (115), (60), (117), and (67), as well as for the (aggregate)
stock of pollutants, shown in equations (122) and (81). The sign of their derivatives are
∂
∂x
(
lim
t→+∞
k˜∗III (t)
)
|x=0= −
β
1
1−β (Φ− α (β − Φ))
(1− β) ((1 + α) ρ) 2−β1−β
< 0, (123)
∂
∂x
(
lim
t→+∞
c˜∗III (t)
)
|x=0= −
(1− β + Φ− α (β − Φ))
(1 + α)(1− β)
(
β
(1 + α) ρ
) 1
1−β
< 0, (124)
∂
∂x
(
lim
t→+∞
z∗III (t)
)
|x=0=
ραβ
((1 + α) ρ)2
> 0, (125)
7As mentioned above, it is not difficult to do the same for the binding regime. One can easily identify as
before a sufficient condition for an ecological catastrophe S (t) > Smax, and proceed with optimal dynamics
when the ceiling is reached. In this case
GM
((1 + 2α) ρ+ (1 + 2α (1− β))x) (ρ+ x)
((1 + α) ρ+ (1 + α (1− β))x)2 > δS
max,
where 0 <
((1+2α)ρ+(1+2α(1−β))x)(ρ+x)
((1+α)ρ+(1+α(1−β))x)2
< 1 because 1 > α > 0.
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∂∂x
(
lim
t→+∞
S∗III (t)
)
|x=0=
GM
δ
2α2β
ρ (1 + α)3
> 0. (126)
As one would expect, benefitting from an exogenous exponential output-augmenting tech-
nological progress gives the economy a wider margin to design optimal sustainable policies: in
particular, the economy can afford in that case a less stringent optimal environmental policy
and a larger stock of pollution than in the “logistic” economy. It should be also noted that
though consumption and capital, both detrended, go down with exponential technical progress,
these two variables exponentially grow in per capita terms in the long-run while per capita con-
sumption and capital converge to constant levels in the logistic case. Ultimately, this exercise
shows clearly to which extent the technological assumptions shape the sustainability problem
under scrutiny: the latter is certainly much less critical when population grows logistically and
technological progress evolves exponentially.
7 Numerical experiments
In this section we take the model to the data. Our benchmark economy, in which population and
technical progress follow an exogenous logistic law of motion, is calibrated using the following
specifications. We set φ = 1.5 and β = 0.4, according to Caballe´ and Santos (1993) and
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993). Then, we fix λ = 1 to set that the planner maximizes
the total utility of the society and population size is taking into account. The relative weight
of environmental care in utility and the discount rate values have been chosen in order to
have a consumption-output ratio close to 0.8 and a capital-output ratio around 3; we obtain
ρ = 0.1 and α = 0.2, which are values quite similar to standard values in the literature.
For the environmental parameters we set δ0 = 0.014 and, according to the literature, we fix
δ¯ = 0.005, Smax = 600 and GM to be consistent with an emission-output ratio equal to 0.12
(see Boucekkine et al., 2013b; Hoel and Karp, 2002 and Nordaus, 2008). Finally, we fix, for the
technological parameters, A(0) = 1, A¯ = 7, x¯ = 0.02 as reference values for all the numerical
experiments.
Related to the demographic parameters we follow the United Nation population projections
(UNPD, 2004). UN report shows three possible demographic scenarios depending on the evo-
lution of the projected world population. We follow the estimated medium scenario from 2000
to 2050 as the baseline case; we normalize the population size in 2000 to N(0) = 1 and, taking
into account the population size in 2050, we calculate N¯ = 1.47. Next, we use the popula-
tion growth rate in 2000 to set n¯ = 0.04 following equation (7). Under this parameterization
GM = 2.83 and S = 551 < Smax. Finally, we need to fix the initial conditions k(0) and S(0). In
all our numerical experiments we assume that the economy is 40% below its long run value for
both state variables (capital and pollution), and we check if the results are sensitive to initial
conditions. Sensitivity analysis around these reference values reveal no qualitative change.
7.1 Logistic and exponential technical progress
To illustrate the analytical results founded in section 6, we compare the solution paths of the rel-
evant variables in two identical economies except for the law of motion of technological progress.
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In figures 1-4, dark lines represent the “logistic” economy and grey lines represent the “expo-
nential” economy. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the pollution stock in both economies. Note
that none of them reaches the pollution ceiling and they do converge to their respective long
run values, S = 551 (553) in the baseline case (exponential case). Since the small differences
between both solution paths are hidden in figure 1, we compare the same trajectories during
the first 30 periods (figure 2), showing that the exponential output-augmenting technological
progress economy can optimally afford a larger stock of pollution than the “logistic economy”.
Consistently, the dirtiness index is higher in the “exponential” economy (figure 3). Unlike the
pollution stock trajectory, the rest of variables z, and detrended consumption (see figure 4)
show a higher convergence speed to its long-run value in the exponential output-augmenting
technological progress economy. As we have mentioned in section 6, although detrended con-
sumption is lower in the exponential output-augmenting technological progress economy along
the transition to its long run level, it exponentially grows in the long run.
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7.2 The role of the altruism parameter
Now we focus on the importance of the degree of intergenerational altruism assumed for eco-
nomic agents in the outcomes of our benchmark economy. Recall that λ contributes to determine
agents preferences, which are represented using a Millian, an intermediate or a Benthamite in-
tertemporal utility function. In sections 4 and 5 we show that the long-run trajectories of the
relevant variables are independent of λ. Brida and Accinelli (2007) and Ferrara and Guerrini
(2009) obtain a similar finding when analyzing the Ramsey model with a population logistic
law of motion8. Since in exogenous growth models it seems that the altruism parameter plays
no role along the balanced growth path, we consider interesting to explore its relevance on
the short-run. In figures 5-8 the dark lines represent the altruistic case, that is λ = 1 and
the grey lines correspond to the selfish case, that is λ = 0. Figures 5 and 6 (figures 7 and 8)
show the transitional dynamics of per capita consumption and the dirtiness index when logistic
(exponential) technological progress
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Figure 7. Figure 8.
8In an endogenous growth model, Boucekkine, Martinez and Ruiz-Tamarit (2013) find that the short and
long run trajectories of the economic variables involved in the Lucas-Uzawa model depend on the altruism
parameter and hence it has a positive effect on the long run growth rate of the economy.
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First, we concentrate on the dirtiness index trajectories (figures 6 and 8). Note that both
trajectories converge to the same value in the long run, which is independent of λ. However,
they diverge in the short run and show a positive relationship between λ and z: when the
central planner maximizes total utility, the economy optimally chooses to devote less resources
to abatement activities and therefore a higher dirtiness index in the short run. As a result, per
capita consumption (figures 5 and 7) is greater in the altruistic economy than in the selfish one,
except during the first periods. The previous results are independent of the law of motion of
technical progress. It is important to notice that the differences founded are slight even when
comparing the two extreme cases. So, although these results are not concluding they reveal
that the formulation of the utility function (Millian, intermediate or Benthamite ) will play a
role in the short term.
7.3 Demographic scenarios
Finally, we show how the environmental variables are affected by demographic dynamics. In this
numerical experiment, we simulate our calibrated economy along three demographic scenarios
based on UN population projections. Our benchmark economy based on the medium UN
scenario is compared to the low and high UN scenarios. To isolate the role of the demographic
variables on the evolution of the pollution stock and on the dirtiness index, we use the same
preference and technological parameter values for the three economies and we set different
demographic parameters following the same procedure as before: we fix N(0) = 1 as the
population level in 2000 along the three demographic scenarios and calculate N¯ and n¯ using
the population projections for 2050 in the high and low scenarios. Note that the emissions
parameter GM has been fixed to obtain an emission-output ratio equal to 0.12 we need to
calculate it for the different demographic scenarios As expected, we obtain that the values of
the emissions parameter are increasing with the level of population via aggregate output.
The following table shows the demographic parameters values for the three scenarios and
the value of the emissions parameter GM .
N n GM
Low scenario 1.22 0.07 2.35
Medium scenario 1.47 0.04 2.834
High scenario 1.75 0.03 3.37
In figures 9-12, pale grey lines represent the benchmark economy and dark (grey) lines
represent the same economy under the low (high) UN scenario Figure 9 compares the stock of
pollution solution paths obtained for the three scenarios. The stock of pollution is decreasing
with the population size in the short and in the long run. It converges to a value less than
the pollution ceiling, S = 457 (S = 551) in the low (medium) scenario. However, things are
quite different for the high scenario. In the latter case, the economy reaches the pollution
ceiling at tc = 451 before the long run stock of pollution value had been reached. Without a
pollution ceiling, the high scenario would reach a long run stock of pollution of 656. Note that
S increases with the population size via the regeneration rate and via the emissions parameter.
So, as we illustrate in the high scenario, larger populations could generate ecological disasters.
As a consequence of the pollution ceiling, beyond tc the stock of pollution keeps constant and
equal to Smax = 600, and the dirtiness index has to be adjusted to keep S = Smax.
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The evolution of the dirtiness index for the three scenarios before the pollution ceiling
is reached in the high scenario is shown in figure 10. They show a similar pattern with z
increasing with population size during the first periods and then converging to a quite similar
value. However, once the pollution ceiling is reached in the high scenario, the evolution of the
dirtiness index is completely different: z has to be adjusted to a lower value in order to keep the
stock of pollution to the pollution ceiling level. Figure 11 compares the solution paths of the
dirtiness index in the medium and high scenarios to show the different patterns of z depending
on the pollution regime. Figure 12 compares the solution paths for detrended consumption in
the medium and high scenarios. Again, both variables have a similar dynamics behavior in
both scenarios before the pollution ceiling is reached in the high scenario. Then, the decrease
in the dirtiness index reflecting that more resources have to be devoted to abatement activities
to avoid catastrophe implies less resources devoted to the production side. As a consequence,
consumption decreases after tc, and converges in the long run to a lower value when we compare
it with consumption trajectory in the medium scenario. Again this finding is consistent with
the theoretical findings in Section 5.
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8 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied a prototype of the sustainable growth problem with some salient
demographic characteristics. The crucial characteristics of optimal sustainable policies have
been singled out, first theoretically, then evaluated using a calibrated model. In particular,
it has been shown how these policies are affected by actual demographic trends. Of course,
this is a first step towards a more comprehensive integration of demographic features into
optimal sustainable growth models. An important direction to be taken is to design models
in the latter class where population control policies are studied. This requires abandoning the
exogenous modelling of demographic dynamics (in this paper, logistic dynamics) and addressing
the important issue of optimal population size in connection with the environmental concerns
outlined in our benchmark analysis. This is not just adding another control, many pending
related ethical issues are on the table. We are currently working along this line.
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